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ASSESSING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF
INCOME TAX REVISION: SOME LESSONS
FROM INCIDENCE ANALYSIS
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ*

IN recent years public attention to issues of tax equity has increased dramatically. The testimony in January 1969 of outgoing Secretary of the Treasury
Joseph Barr that 154 individuals who had adjusted gross incomes of more
than $200,000 in 1966 paid no federal income tax intensified public awareness
and concern about the equity of the tax system. Tax reform has remained a
central issue of public policy.
At the same time, scholars working in the tax field have refined their
methods of analyzing the impact on individuals and classes of individuals of
tax laws and tax changes. Theoretical advances in two areas have been particularly important: analysis of tax incidence and shifting; 1 and tax expenditure
analysis.2 Curiously, however, these analytical techniques have not been
combined to evaluate distributional consequences of changes in the personal
income tax. Tax expenditure analysis treats income tax discrimination among
various income-generating activities as the functional equivalent of a subsidy
to the activity that receives relatively favorable treatment. Tax incidence
analysis teaches that a tax (or a subsidy) on a particular activity will be
borne, at least in part, by persons other than those engaging in the activity
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Richard Bonnie, Jerry Mashaw, Warren Schwartz, and Emil Sunley
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
I For a good collection of the literature concerning tax incidence, see Peter Mieszkowski,
Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income, 9 J. Econ.
Lit. 1103 (1969). The literature is summarized and appraised in George F. Break, The
Incidence and Economic Effects of Taxation, in Alan S. Blinder, et al., The Economics
of Public Finance 119 (Brookings, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Break]. See also Horst
Claus Recktenwald, Tax Incidence and Income Redistribution (Martha V. Stolper trans.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Recktenwald].
2 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705
(1970); Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures With Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 352 (1970);
Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Pathways]. Compare Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 Nat. Tax. J. 244 (1969).
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who are nominally subject to the tax. It would seem to follow that the impact
of income tax discrimination among various types of income-producing activity would likewise extend to persons other than the nominal taxpayer.
Nevertheless, estimates of the distributive effect of changes in the personal
income tax law are typically based on the assumption that the person
nominally affected by the change will bear its entire impact. In this article
I will merge incidence and tax expenditure approaches to question this
assumption.
TAX

EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

Tax expenditure analysis identifies a system of "tax expenditures" under
which government financial assistance is carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct government expenditures. It is argued that
using the tax system rather than direct payments produces inefficiencies in the
allocation of resources and inequities in the distribution of the tax burden
because "[Tax Expenditures] are worth more to the High Income Taxpayer
than the Low Income Taxpayer." 3 In an attempt to quantify the distributional
effects of tax expenditures, official reports of the Treasury and the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation have produced tables which
report the "Estimated Distribution of Selected Items of Tax Preferences of
Individuals by Adjusted Gross Income Class."14 These tables are used not only
by the Treasury and the tax-writing committees of the Congress, but also by
academicians analyzing the tax system, 5 and they appear in casebooks designed
to teach law students the fundamentals of income taxation. 6 Ralph Nader's
Tax Reform Research Group has argued that these estimated distributions
of items of tax preference by income class understate the concentration
of benefits in the higher income classes because of a failure to take into
account the number of taxpayers in each income class. 7
8
The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs, hearings before the Subcomm. on
Priorities & Economy in Gov't. of the Jt. Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 48-59 (Jan.
1972) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey).
4
Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform, hearings before the Jt. Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., app. E, at 165-68 (July 1972) [hereinafter cited as Tax Subsidies] (statement of
Edwin S. Cohen, Under Secretary of the Treasury); Staff of Treasury Dep't. & Jt. Comm.
on Internal Revenue Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., tab. 2, at 6-9 (Comm. Print, October 4, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Treasury & Jt.
Comm. Estimates], also reprinted in Prepared Statements Submitted to . . . Panel Discussions on Tax Reform, before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 31-34 [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussions].
5 Pathways 89-91.
6
Adrian A. Kragen & John K. McNulty, Federal Income Taxation: Cases and
Materials 644-645 (2d ed. 1974); Stanley S. Surrey, et al., Federal Income Taxation:
Cases and Materials 43 (1973).
7 See Tax Subsidies 209-13 (statement of Thomas H. Stanton, Director, Tax Reform
Research Group). An example of an estimate submitted by this group is set forth at
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Recent tax reform efforts, particularly the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the
Revenue Act of 1974 drafted by the House Ways and Means Committee, have
taken the form of attempts to increase the "low effective rate of tax of high
income taxpayers" by eliminating or reducing specific "tax expenditures" or
"tax preferences." Those who advocate elimination of tax preferences claim
that it would increase the burden of taxation on high income taxpayers. Such
conclusions flow naturally from the official estimates of the distribution of
preferences by income class. But the estimates "do not take into account any
effects that the removal of one or more of the items might have on investment
patterns, consumption or other aspects of economic activity. In other words,
the estimates shown do not take into account the induced effects of changing
the provisions." 9 The induced effects, however, can dramatically affect the
distributional impact of elimination of a particular preference item. The
question is closely related to the broader issue of tax incidence.
TAx SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE, IN GENERAL

The incidence of a tax is determined by the changes it brings about in the
distribution of real incomes available for private use. These changes depend
principally upon the impact of the tax on relative prices and relative factor
incomes.1 ° It is axiomatic that the incidence of a tax can be quite different from
what would be suggested merely by looking at the income groups subject to the
statutory impact of the tax. A manufacturer's excise tax on automobiles, for
note 38, infra. The overall impression of an inequitable distribution of tax benefits
from tax expenditures has been bolstered by other estimates of the distribution of the
tax burden by income class. See, e.g., The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs, supra
note 3, at 59-73 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner). See also
Joseph A. Pechman & Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the Tax Burden? (Brookings,
1974).
8 See, e.g., Panel Discussions.
9 Treasury & Jt. Comm. Estimates 2.
The Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1976 contains a special analysis of
tax expenditures. This analysis acknowledges that the working hypothesis that "taxpayer
behavior and general economic conditions [will] remain unchanged in response to the
hypothetical change in the tax laws" is, in many cases, "unrealistic." Moreover, the
analysis cautions against inferring
that the benefits of the special tax treatment rest fully or even mostly with the corporations or individuals whose taxes are initially affected. Benefits are often passed on to
others in the form of lower prices for particular goods or services or in other ways
become widely diffused. For example, the deductibility of charitable contributions does
not merely lower individual or corporate liabilities; the individuals and institutions that
receive the contributions benefit also.
Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976, Special
Analysis F, Tax Expenditures, at 105, 107.
10See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance In Theory and
Practice (1973) [hereinafter cited as Musgrave & Musgrave]; Break 123; Joseph A.
Pechman & Benjamin A. Okner, supra note 7, at 27-29.
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example, while imposed by statute on and collected from automobile manufacturers can be expected to raise prices of automobiles relative to other goods
and thus to be borne, at least in part, by purchasers of automobiles. To determine that such a tax is regressive, we must know that automobile consumption
declines more rapidly as income rises than consumption of untaxed products.
If consumption of automobiles declines less rapidly, the effect of the tax may
be progressive."1
The most vigorous tax incidence dispute has been over the corporate income
tax.1 2 Since it is imposed by statute on a legal entity, the corporation (which
is nothing more than a collection of individuals organized within a particular
legal framework to conduct business), the question naturally arises as to
what classes of individuals are in fact burdened by the corporate income
tax-shareholders, as owners of the firm? Employees of the firm? Consumers
of the firm's products? Owners of capital generally? The question which
class of individuals actually "pays" the tax is crucial in determining the
distribution of the corporate tax burden by income class. 18
Debates over tax incidence have not been limited to the corporate income
tax. Until recently, economists generally agreed that the burden of the
property tax on rental property was in large part shifted from owners of the
property (the statutory taxpayers) to renters, who bore the tax in proportion
to the rentals paid, 14 and hence was regressive and should be replaced by
"more progressive" (or "less regressive") forms of taxation, such as the
value-added tax.'1 But the traditional incidence assumptions concerning the
property tax are undergoing intensive reexamination, and many economists
11 See Break 125-26; Musgrave & Musgrave 429.
12 See, e.g., Marian Krzyzaniak & Richard A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax (1963); R. Goode, Rates of Return, Income Shares and Corporate Tax
Incidence, and R. Slitor, Corporate Tax Incidence: Economic Adjustments to Differentials
Under a Two-Tier Structure, both in The Facts of Corporate Income Tax (Marian
Krzyzaniak ed. 1966); John G. Cragg, Arnold Harberger & Peter Mieszkowski, Empirical Evidence of the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 75 J. Pol. Econ.
811 (1967); M. Krzyzaniak & R. A. Musgrave, Corporation Tax Shifting: A Response,
78 J. PoL Econ. 768 (1970); John G. Cragg, Arnold C. Harberger & Peter Mieszkowski,
Corporation Tax Shifting: Rejoinder, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 774 (1970); Break 138-54.
Is For example, one study has estimated that the effective tax rate of taxpayers with
adjusted family income of one million dollars or more is 40% if the corporation income
tax is assumed to be borne by shareholders but only 19% if borne by owners of capital
generally, and an even lower rate if shifted forward to consumers. Joseph A. Pechman,
Distribution of Federal and State Income Taxes by Income Classes, 27 J. Fin. 179,
187 (1972) (tab. 4).
14
See, e.g., Henry Aaron, A New View of Property Tax Incidence, 64 Am. Econ. Rev.
Papers & Proceedings 212 (May 1974); Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax
(1966); Dick Netzer, The Incidence of the Property Tax Revisited, 26 Nat. Tax J. 515
(1973); Musgrave & Musgrave 412-21; Break 154-68.
15 See, e.g., Frank V. Fowlkes, Administration Leans to Value-Added Tax to Help
Solve National Fiscal Crises, 4 Nat. Tax J. 210 (1972).
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now view the property tax as a tax on capital with a decidedly progressive
impact.""
Similarly, the incidence of payroll taxes has recently undergone careful
scrutiny. General agreement has been reached that the burden of the em-

ployers' share of social security taxes is "shifted" to employees in the form of
lower wages or to consumers in the form of higher prices.1 7 These conclusions
have, of course, major implications with regard to the equity of financing any
new government insurance scheme-for example, national health insurancethrough payroll taxes.18
As these comments suggest, assumptions about tax incidence play a key
role in tax policy decisions. Indeed, incidence determinations are crucial to an
evaluation of the degree of progressivity in the tax system as a whole.19 Yet
the "true" incidence of the corporate income tax, the property tax, and the
payroll tax has not been resolved. Economists perceive an urgent need for
further research. 20 Their present uncertainty has greatly complicated the
21
formulation of tax policy.
10
See Henry Aaron, supra note 14; Richard A. Musgrave, Is a Property Tax on
Housing Regressive?, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings 222 (1974); Discussion by
Brazer, Netzer, et al., 64 id. at 231-35.
17
See John A. Brittain, The Payroll Tax for Social Security (1972) ; John A. Brittain,
The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 110 (1971); Martin
S. Feldstein & John A. Brittain, The Incidence of the Social Security Tax: Comment
and Reply, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 735-42 (1972); Musgrave & Musgrave 390-95; Break
168-75.
I8 Both the Administration proposal and the Mills-Kennedy bill proposing a national
health insurance plan would finance health insurance programs by payroll taxes.
19
The significance of various incidence assumption is illustrated by Professors Richard
and Peggy Musgrave as follows:
20
See, e.g., Break; Joseph A. Pechman & Benjamin A. Okner, supra note 7, at 10.
21 For example, Pechman and Okner, in a recent attempt to describe effective rates of
tax, test five different assumptions about the incidence of the corporate, income tax. See
Benjamin A. Okner & Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes in 1966?, 64 Am. Econ.
Rev. Papers & Proceedings 168, 170 (tab. 1) (May 1974). Professors Richard and
Peggy Musgrave adopt that "benchmark" assumption is that one-half of the corporate
income tax is paid by consumers and one-half by recipients of income from capital.
Musgrave & Musgrave 367 (tab. 15-1). A special committee of the tax section of the
American Bar Association evaluating a proposal for substitution of a value-added tax
for the corporate income tax used two alternative assumptions about the burden of the
corporate income tax. Report of a Subcomm. of the Spec. Comm. on Value Added Tax,
Section of Taxation, American Bar Ass'n., Should the United States Adopt the ValueAdded Tax?, 26 Tax Lawyer 45, 51 (corporation income tax assumed to be borne twothirds by stockholders and one-third by consumers), 57 (corporation income tax
divided equally between stockholders and consumers) (1972). The Treasury Department
in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress illustrated the
distribution effects of five different assumptions. Tax Subsidies app. F, at 169 (statement
of the Hon. Edwin S. Cohen, Undersecretary of the Treasury).
Pechman and Okner used three different assumptions about the burden of the
property tax on improvements, and two assumptions about the incidence of the employer's share of the payroll tax. See Benjamin A. Okner & Joseph A. Pechman, supra,
at 170, 169.

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

In contrast to the continuing uncertainty over the incidence of corporate
income, property, and payroll taxes, economists consider the incidence of the
individual income tax to be "relatively certain."' 2 They have assumed it is not
shifted at all but is borne by the statutory taxpayer. Every attempt to allocate
the burden of income taxes by income class is based upon this assumption. 2
This assumption also underlies the effective-tax-rate tables utilized by Treasury
and congressional staff economists in providing information to decision makers
SIG NcANcE OF ALT RNATrV

Ix cmNcE Asstu0noNs

(TAx AS PERCENT Or TOTAL FAMILY INCOim)
Selected Income Brackets

Corporation Tax
1. One-half capital income,
one-half consumption
2. Dividend income
3. Capital income
4. Consumption
5. One-half capital income, onefourth consumption, onefourth wages
Property Tax*
6. OR on owner: R on tenant;
B-one-half capital income,
one-half consumption
7. All on capital income
8. OR on owner, R and B on
capital income
9. OR on owner, R on tenant,
B on capital income
10. OR on owner, R on tenant,
B on consumption
Payroll Tax
11. Employer tax on consumption,
employee tax on wages
12. All on wages
Total, All Levels of Government1
13. Line 17, Table 15-1
14. Substituting lines 2 for 1,
7 for 6, 12 for 11
15. Substituting lines 4 for 1,
10 for 6

$4,000$5,700

$12,500$17,500

6.0

5.0

31.4

35.6

$35,000$92,000

$92,000
and over

39.0

63.2

25.6

26.9

* OR stands for owner-occupied residences; R stands for rental property; B stands for other business
property.
t Includes the payroll tax.
Source: Musgrave & Musgrave 370 (tab. 1-2).
22 E.g., Break 175.

23 See, e.g., Benjamin A. Okner & Joseph A. Pechman, supra note 21, at 170; Musgrave & Musgrave 367; Recktenwald 184-85 (tab. VI-12, Bases for the Allocation of
the Tax Burden by Income Class in Previous Studies).
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EVISION

about the "burden distribution" by income classes of specific proposals for
changing the tax law. 24 Tables depicting the "estimated distribution of selected
tax preferences" are also based upon this assumption.
But the universal application of the assumption is unwarranted. The implication of theoretical work in closely analogous areas is that selective shifting of
the personal income tax does occur, and it could have dramatic impact in
terms of the burden distribution of various tax changes by income class. By
failing to consider this possibility, legislators may, as we are about to see, enact
changes in the income tax laws that have distributional effects quite different
from those desired.
ExCISE-TYPE

TAX EFFECTS

OF THE INDIVIDUAL

AND OF INCOME

INCOME TAX

TAX SunsmiEs

The general assumption about the incidence of the individual income tax
is based upon analysis of a "general" income tax.25 But the income tax in the
United States has never been such a tax. It involves a high degree of discrimination: income from different forms of capital produce varying tax liabilities;
likewise, wage income in the form of fringe benefits or deferred compensation
is often untaxed or taxed at reduced rates. In 1972 personal income in the
United States totalled $936 billion but taxable income amounted to only
$446 billion. And this pattern-where the tax base of the personal income
tax is only about one-half of personal income--has been the prevailing condition in the United States for many years. 20
Incidence assumptions based upon analyses of a "general" income tax
are inadequate for policy recommendations for revising our nation's income
tax laws because of the failure to take into account the nature and extent of
the excise-tax-like changes in relative prices and factor incomes that are likely
to be brought about as a result of the multiple discriminations in the personal
income tax. Such changes will depend upon the operative tax provisions and
the prevailing market forces. 27 Income tax discrimination is so widespread
24

See note 4, supra. See also Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 17, tab. 5; Rep. of
Comm. on Finance on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Senate Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (tab. 5).
25
See, e.g., Musgrave & Musgrave 378-390.
26 Compare U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1973,
at 324, with U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Preliminary Statistics of Income-Individual
Income Tax Returns: 1972, at 5 (1974). Taxable income in 1972 was 47.6% of personal
income. In 1968, personal income was $689 billion; taxable income was $353 billion51.2% of personal income. See Otto Eckstein, Public Finance 60 (3d ed. 1974). In 1959,
taxable income was $167 billion while personal income totalled $383 billion; taxable income was 43.6% of personal income. See Edwin S. Cohen, Substantive Federal Tax
Reform, 50 Va. L. Rev. 628, 649-50 (1964).
27 See Richard Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance 370 (1959).
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that, given the current state of incidence-analysis methodology in a multiplediscrimination context, it may be more fruitful in developing policy recommendations to utilize micro-type analysis such as that employed in efforts to
28
determine the distributional effects of excise taxes or subsidies.
The suggestion that changes in relative prices and factor incomes are likely
to result from income tax revision is consistent with an analysis of discriminatory income tax provisions as the equivalent of government expenditures, since,
in incidence terms, subsidies are analogous to particular factor or excise-type
taxes.29 Micro-analysis of the shifting and incidence of subsidies and welfare
payments will often shed substantial light on the distributional effects of the

subsidy.30
A recent "Tax Expenditure Budget" produced by the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress lists nearly $60 billion of tax expenditures,31 but,
as indicated earlier, estimates of the distribution of these "subsidies" by income class fail to take into account instances where the incidence of the subsidy is different from its statutory impact. When the recipient of the subsidy
(in this case a reduced tax burden) loses all or part of the subsidy, the benefit
is "shifted" ("shared" may be a better word for benefits) to others.32
In evaluating the distributional consequences of a repeal or revision of a
"tax subsidy" provision, it is necessary to estimate what portion, if any,
of the subsidy has been shared by the initial recipient with others and to
determine the effect of this sharing on the relative income of the recipient and
2

8 Some economists have acknowledged that the discriminatory nature of the individual
income tax in the United States suggests the possibility of some selective shifting:
The existence of various market imperfections may thus permit some shifting of the
income tax.... However the extent of such shifting is likely to be selective rather than
general. The overall conclusion remains that the individual income tax may by and
large be taken to stay put.
Musgrave & Musgrave 390. The tendency is to view this "as a matter of tax avoidance
rather than shifting." Ibid. In part this seems to be due to the currently limited ability
to make empirical estimates of tax incidence patterns in a multiple discrimination
context. See Break 153. But there has been at least one attempt to quantify the incidence
effects of differential taxation of income from capital. John B. Shoven & John Whalley,
A General Equilibrium Calculation of the Effects of Differential Taxation of Income
from Capital in the U.S., 1 J. Pub. Econ. 281 (1972).
29
E.g., Carl Shoup, Public Finance 149-61 (1969).
80fd. at 15-16.
81 Staff of the Jt. Econ. Comm., Federal Subsidy Programs (Comm. Print, October 17
1974), reprinted in BNA Daily Tax Rpt., Oct. 18, 1974, at J-1 to J-3. This estimate is
similar in magnitude to other recent estimates. See, e.g., Pathways 7 ($65 billion estimate);
Musgrave & Musgrave 247 ($55 billion estimate). The most recent estimate of tax expenditures totals about $90 billion. See Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976, at 108-09.
32
In many cases, the benefits of a subsidy will be divided between producer and
consumer (buyer and seller), depending upon the relative elasticities of supply and
demand. Carl Shoup, supra note 29, at 149-61.

INCOME TAX REVISION

others. Since recent Congressional activity concerning "tax reform" has taken
the form of attempts to increase the "low effective rate of tax of high income
taxpayers" by eliminating or reducing specific "tax preferences," the distributional implications of such "shifting" will be illustrated in the context of tax
preferences targeted for revision by those who seek a more progressive income
tax.
A CLEAR CASE OF SoM

SHIFTING-INTEREST ON TAx-EXEMPT BONDS

The exemption from income tax of interest on state and local bonds 3 is
often described as one of the most important provisions allowing high-income
taxpayers to escape tax and thus eroding the progressivity of the income tax.
Although the issue has not been addressed explicitly as a question of incidence
or shifting, it is clear that if the present tax exemption were eliminated the
entire increase in tax would not be borne by the purchasers of taxable state
and local bonds who would, as a statutory matter, pay the tax on the interest
from the bonds.34 The tax exemption has lowered the amount of tax paid by
owners of the bonds, but it has also lowered the interest paid by state and
local governments to owners of such bonds. The benefits of the tax exemption
are, in effect, shared by the owners of the bonds (the statutory beneficiaries)
and state and local governments.
The effect of the tax exemption on interest rates of municipal bonds is in
Table 1, which sets forth the ratio of yields of municipal bonds to yields
TABLE 1
RATio op NEw IssuE MueicuPeAL To Com'oARn BoNs

YiELDS a

Grade
Year

AAA

AA

A

BAA

1955
1960
1965
1966
1967

69
68
70
67
64

71
74
71
68
65

79
76
72
70
67

81
79
73
70
67

1968

64

65

67

69

1969
1970

70
73

72
73

73
73

73
70

1971

69

69

69

67

1972

70

70

70

69

a (Municipal yields/corporate yield) X 100.
Source: Computed from Moody's.U

33 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 103.
3
4See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 99-101 (2d ed. 1971); David J. Ott &
Allan H. Meltzer, Federal Tax Treatment of State and Local Securities (1963).
35 See Panel Discussions, pt. 8, at 1211 (tab. 2) (statement of Wallace 0. Sellers).
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of corporate bonds considered to be similar credit risks. The effect is also
reflected in estimates of the distribution of the total revenue loss from the
tax exemption among state and local governments and owners of the bonds.
The House Ways and Means Committee estimated in 1969 that a total
revenue loss to the federal government of $1.8 billion produced a $1.3 billion
annual savings in interest costs for state and local governments. 36 A more
recent estimate suggests a total loss of $3.3 billion with an interest savings to
states and localities of $2.5 billion.3 7 Using either of these estimates, the
savings to state and local governments is about 70-75 per cent of the total
revenue loss. Elimination of the tax exemption would undoubtedly require
higher interest rates for state and local bonds. Yet the official "estimated
distribution by adjusted gross income class" of the $1 billion revenue loss
due to individuals' taking advantage of the tax exemption does not take into
account the interest savings. Table 2 reproduces the official estimates :38
Table 3 illustrates a distribution that reflects the savings in interest costs
to state and local governments. The table is based on the assumption that
state and local governments will finance the increased interest costs that
39
would result from repeal of the tax exemption through general tax revenues.
86 Report of the Committee on Ways and Means on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, pt.
1, at 173 (1969). For a discussion of the uncertain nature of estimates of the revenue
loss from the tax exemption for state and local bonds, see Michael J. Graetz, Reflections
on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 Va. L. Rev. 1389, 1415-22 (1972).
37 Panel Discussions pt. 8, at 1235 (statement of Dr. Frank E. Morris).
38 See also Treasury & Jt. Comm. Estimates 9. As indicated in the text at note 7,
estimates by the Tax Reform Research Group which take into account the number of
individuals in each adjusted gross income class show an even greater concentration of
benefits in the higher income classes:

Adjusted gross income class

Exemption of interest on state and local debt
(in dollars per return)

0 to $ 3,000
$ 3,000 to $ 5,000
$ 5,000 to $ 7,000
$ 7,000 to $ 10,000
$ 10,000 to $ 15,000
$ 15,000 to $ 20,000
$ 20,000 to $ 50,000
$ 50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 and over

0.28
*
*

.39
.71
3.61
27.81
853.00
4,621.31

Source: Tax Subsidies 213 (statement of Thomas H. Stanton).

89 This table is based on the assumption that 70% of the revenue loss from the
tax exemption is reflected in lower interest costs to state and local governments and
that this 70% benefits income classes of individuals in proportion to the burdens that
they bear of general state and local tax revenues. In other words, the table assumes that
repeal of the exemption would increase interest costs to state and local governments and
that state and local governments would finance the increased interest costs out of
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TABLE 2
cTE) ITEMs or TAX PRFFRENCE By
CLASS, CALENDAR YEAR 1972

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF S
AnjusTED GRoss ITCOM

Adjusted gross income class
0
$ 3,000
$ 5,000
$ 7,000
$ 10,000
$ 15,000
$ 20,000
$ 50,000
$100,000

Exemption of interest on state and local debt
(in millions of dollars)

to $ 3,000
to $ 5,000
to $ 7,000
to $ 10,000
to $ 15,000
to $ 20,000
to $ 50,000
to $100,000
and over

5

5
10
25
125
375
455

Total

1,000

Source: Pathways 91.
TABLE 3
Adjusted gross income class

Exemption of interest on state and local debt
(in millions of dollars)

0 to $ 3,000
$ 3,000 to $ 5,000
$ 5,000 to $ 7,000
$ 7,000 to $ 10,000
$ 10,000 to $ 15,000
$ 15,000 to $ 20,000
$ 20,000 to $ 50,000
$ 50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 and over

56.5
77
91
99.5
130
40.5
72.5
141.5
157.5

The official estimates, which ignore the interest savings to state and local
governments, show that 83 per cent of the benefits from the tax exemption
general revenues. Of course, the impact of repeal of the exemption would vary from
state to state but no attempt has been made to take interstate differences into account.
The allocation of the burden of general state and local taxes is derived from Table 3
of a paper by Atliat F. Ott, Estimating the Distribution of the Tax Burden (U.S. Treasury
Dep't, Office of the Secretary, Office of Tax Analysis). Ott derived her distribution of state
and local taxes from the following incidence assumptions:
(1) Individual income taxes are borne by the statutory taxpayer.
(2) Corporate income taxes are borne by the owners (zero shifting).
(3) Excise and sales taxes are shifted forward to consumers.
(4) Estate and gift taxes are not shifted.
(5) Payroll taxes fall on wage earners.
(6) Property taxes are borne equally by homeowners (and renters) and consumers.
Other incidence assumptions would produce different results, but the general direction
of change between Table 2 and Table 3 would be the same. Table 3 allocates the 30%
of the benefit of the tax savings (which is not reflected in lower interest costs) by
income class in the same manner as Table 2 allocates the entire benefit.
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accrues to individuals with adjusted gross income over $50,000 and only four
per cent of the benefits goes to individuals with adjusted gross income of
$20,000 or less. But when the interest savings is taken into account, the
benefits from the tax exemption appear to be spread far more evenly through
the income classes. About half of the benefits goes to individuals with adjusted
gross incomes of $20,000 or less, and less than one-third of the revenue loss
benefits individuals with adjusted gross incomes above $50,000. Repeal of the
tax exemption would have dramatically different effect on the progressivity
of the income tax from that suggested by the official estimates.
A general recognition that the distribution of benefits from the tax exemption
is more closely approximated by the second table than by the first may
partially explain the recent coupling of proposals for elimination of the exemption with suggestions for a new federal payment to state and local governments
40
to subsidize interest on taxable bonds.
TAx SHELTERS FOR Low- AND MODERATE-INcoME HOUSING

The Internal Revenue Code contains a variety of provisions reducing income taxes on investors in low and moderate income housing. The use of these
provisions in combination produces one common variety of the real estate tax
shelter.41 The most notable of these provisions are those allowing accelerated
depreciation on the full cost of housing including borrowed funds ;42 a five-year
write-off for expenses for major rehabilitation of low and moderate income
housing; 48 deduction of interest and taxes during the construction period; 44
and a rollover provision which permits deferral of tax on any gain from the
40
See, e.g., Panel Discussions, pt. 8; Report of the Committee on Ways & Means,
supra note 36, at 172. There may be good policy reasons for eliminating the tax exemption for interest on state and local bonds, particularly if such elimination is accompanied
by a direct interest subsidy. For example, there would likely be gains in efficiency: new
markets such as pension funds where the tax exemption now provides no inducement
would be opened for state and local bonds. But the increase in progressivity that would
result from such a change is often overstated because of a failure to take into account
changes in interest rates that would occur if the tax exemption were eliminated.
41 For a detailed description of the low-income housing tax shelter see Panel Discussions,
pt. 4, at 559-72 (statement of Jerome Kurtz) ; Jerome Kurtz, Real Estate Tax ShelterA Postscript, 26 Nat. Tax J. 341 (1973); William S. McKee, The Real Estate Tax
Shelter: A Computerized Expose, 57 Va. L. Rev. 521 (1971); C. Willis Ritter & Emil M.
Sunley, Jr., Real Estate and Tax Reform: An Evaluation of the Real Estate Provisions
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 30 Md. L. Rev. 5 (1970).
42 See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st
Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 926 (1951). See also Internal Revenue Code of 1954

§ 167(j).

43 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 167(k).
44 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 163 & 164.
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sale of such housing45 until death, when income tax on the gain is forgiven
forever.46
Proponents of elimination of the tax benefits for low- and moderate-income
housing have indicated that the major benefits of the tax reductions accrue to
high income taxpayers, and that the provisions therefore undermine the
progressivity of the tax system. 47 For example, the Treasury and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 48 estimate the distribution of the tax
benefits of accelerated depredation and rehabilitation write-off by income
class as follows:
TABLE 4
ESTmArTED Dism B ToN OF SELEcTED Iraxs OF TAX PREFESENcES OF INDIVIDuALS

BY ADJUSTED GRoss INcomm CLAss, CALENDAR YEAR 1972

Depredation
on rental

Adjusted gross
income class
0 to $ 3,000
$

3,000 to $

housing in
excess of
straight-line

Housing
rehabilitation

$ 1,000,000

5,000

4,000,000

a

$ 5,000 to $ 7,000
$ 7,000 to $ 10,000

7,000,000
14,000,000

a

$

10,000 to

$

a

15,000

28,000,000

$ 15,000 to $ 20,000

25,000,000

1,000,000

$ 20,000 to $ 50,000

86,000,000

3,000,000

$ 50,000 to $100,000

53,000,000

8,000,000

$100,000 and over

32,000,000

12,000,000

$250,000,000

$25,000,000

Total

$ 1,000,000

-Less than $500,000.

Table 4 shows that 70.5 per cent of the tax savings is distributed to individuals with more than $20,000 of income. Individuals with adjusted gross
incomes between $7,000 and $20,000 receive about 25 per cent of the benefits,
and individuals with adjusted gross incomes of $7,000 or less-low income
individuals--receive less than five per cent of the benefits.
But this distribution assumes that individuals who pay lower taxes because
of these provisions receive the entire benefits of the tax reduction. However,
45 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1039.
46 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1014.
47 See, e.g., materials cited supra note 41; Pathways 236-46. Professor Surrey focuses
his major criticism on the inefficiency of using the tax system as a means of subsidizing
low and moderate income housing. This criticism and an overall evaluation of the
provisions are beyond the scope of this article.
48Pathways 89. See also Treasury & Jt. Comm. Estimates 7.
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the tax reductions for investments in low and moderate income housing may be
at least partially reflected in lower rents for low and moderate income
housing. 49 The debate over the incidence of the local real property tax is
relevant here. Many studies of the property tax assume that owners of rental
property shift the tax on improvements to renters by charging higher rents. 50
This view has been challenged recently and some argue that the property tax
is borne by owners of capital. 51 But no comparable debate has occurred over
possible shifting of the income tax on rental income. If the value of property
merely represents the current discounted value of a future stream of income,
why should the incidence of a property tax on value differ substantially from
that of an income tax on rents from the property? 52 No attempt has been
made to delineate the characteristics of an income tax that would produce
53
different incidence results.
Professor Musgrave has provided an analysis of a national property tax on
housing in which he expresses particular concern about the incidence of such
a tax on rents for low and moderate income housing:
While comprising only 20 per cent of the total housing base, rental housing is
of special concern since it weighs heavily at the lower end of the income scale.
Housing markets, especially for low-income housing in central city settings, may
well be markets where landlords act as restrained monopolists (being threatened
by rent control and/or public rage) who find it justified to raise rents as taxes
are increased, or where tax increases may act as a signal to landlord-oligopolists to
raise rents. Rate reductions in turn may or may not have opposite effects. While
the fact that rental contracts or rent controls frequently allow for tax increases
...

49 The possibility that special tax provisions for investments in real estate produce
lower rents was acknowledged by Jerome Kurtz, former Tax Legislative Counsel of
the United States Treasury Department, in testimony before the Ways and Means
Committee where he stated: "Real estate is a risky industry. The question is whether
the developer ought to be compensated for undertaking these risks by the Federal
Government through the tax system. Developing a shopping center takes six, seven,
eight years, which is not at all unusual but why should Macy's pay less rent because
the Federal Government is granting tax incentives to the developer to build it." Panel
Discussions, pt. 4, at 578. Henry Aaron in an extensive study of housing subsidies
attempted to quantify the reduction in rental housing costs as a result of the favorable
accelerated depreciation provisions. See Henry Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies: Who
Benefits from Federal Housing Policies? 66-69 (Brookings 1972).
50 See, e.g., Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax, supra note 14; Musgrave &
Musgrave 412-21.
51 See, e.g., Henry Aaron, supra note 14, at 212; Peter Mieszkowski, The Property
Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 73 (1972); Dick Netzer, The
Incidence of the Property Tax Revisited, supra note 14.
52 The question in the text ignores geographical disparities due to the fact that the
property tax in the United States is imposed at a local level. The better property tax
analogue for the question raised in the text would be a national property tax. See
Richard A. Musgrave, supra note 16.
53 See Boris I. Bittker, supra note 11, at 799, n. 50.
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is no proof that the tax is passed on to consumers through the mechanism of
imperfect markets, it at least raises such suspicion. Given inelastic demand for
low cost housing and a relatively elastic short-run supply through varying levels
of maintenance, these possibilities cannot be ruled out. I would suspect that a
substantial amount of initial shifting into higher rentals does in fact result. This
being the case, I do not accept the extreme assumption that no part of the
tax is shifted to the tenants. Rather, I prefer to allocate a substantial part of the
tax on this basis.... The burden-shifting now visualized involves an initial passing
on of the burden from landlords (on whom the statutory burden rests) to tenants.
Landlords effect this by drawing on previously unrealized monopoly power, thus
leaving capital income initially free of burden (or in any case with a lesser burden)
and involving a burdening of tenants rather than a redistribution among consumers.
While further shifts in capital allocation and excise effects will follow, the end
result will differ (i.e., leave a heavier burden on tenants and be more regressive)
54
from that under [another] model.
Professor Musgrave's description of the market for low and moderate income
housing suggests that similar shifting assumptions might also be appropriate
for increases in the income tax on landlords' rental income from low and
moderate income housing.
The profit-maximization assumption is clearly not valid when applied in
the context of housing programs where the government has limited before-tax
profits. For example, under section 236 of the National Housing Act, mortgage
funding is provided but the investor is limited to a return of six per cent before
tax on the amount invested above the mortgage.5 5 This produces about a four
per cent return on the actual investment. 50 This return is clearly inadequate
to induce investment in a high-risk venture such as construction of low- and
moderate-income housing. The entire section 236 program is premised on the
fact that the current tax laws produce a much higher after-tax rate of return
than the limited before-tax return implies. 57 If the tax laws were changed to
tax fully the nominal before-tax return, the six per cent allowable return
would probably have to be at least tripled before any investment could be
expected. Such an increase in the permitted rate of return would necessarily
require higher rentals from the low and moderate income individuals who
occupy such housing. Thus, an elimination of tax provisions that reduce income
54 Richard A. Musgrave, supra note 16, at 224. Professor Musgrave's view was
questioned in the discussion that followed the presentation of Professor Musgrave's
paper. See, e.g., 64 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings 234 (May 1974) (statement of
Earl R. Rolph).
55 National Housing Act of 1934, § 236, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1970). See Pathways
239-46; Panel Discussions, pt. 4, at 553-72 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). Many states
that provide subsidies to low- and moderate-income housing also limit profits.
56 See Pathways 241.
57 For a taxpayer in the 50% marginal bracket, the after-tax return is in the neighborhood of 15-207. See Pathways 240. See also materials cited in note 41 supra.
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taxes on rents from low and moderate income housing is likely to be reflected
partially in higher rentals, thereby producing a burden distribution quite
different from that suggested by the official estimates. 58
TAx SHELTERS FOR DOCTORS-THE SHIFTING QUESTION
FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE

This part of the article approaches the shifting question in a different way.
Rather than focusing on the price effect of specific tax preferences, I here discuss other possible sharing effects of tax reductions utilized by particular
classes of taxpayers.
Doctors are notorious for their efforts to minimize income taxes by taxshelter investments.5 9 Since doctors typically earn high incomes, their use of
tax-preference provisions is attacked as an erosion of the progressivity of the
income tax. 60 But one should ask whether the tax increases that would result
if the preferences were eliminated could be shifted, in whole or in part, by
the statutory taxpayers to others.
If individuals maximize monetary profits prior to imposition of the income
tax-or prior to an increase in the tax-they will not be able to shift a tax
increase to others by demanding higher payments. But if, prior to an increase
in tax, they receive less than the maximum they are able to obtain, they might
well succumb to pressures to maintain their after-tax income by increasing the
prices charged for their services.
Doctors, in large part because of legal barriers to entry, may have discretion
to set prices without regard to competition, and charity motives may sometimes
produce zero prices or prices below marginal costs for poor patients.6 1 It may
be that a tax increase would change their consumption mix, particularly
their consumption of such in-kind charity, and would tend to inspire physicians to revise their fees upwards to maintain their previous after-tax position.
Moreover, if they are already following a profit-maximization pricing policy
58 With respect to a closely analogous situation, the Congress, in the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975, P.L. 94-12, for the first time, attempted to deal with the possible price effects of
a tax expenditure. A new tax credit of up to $2,000 is provided for taxpayers who purchase a new principal residence in 1975 or 1976. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 44.
In an attempt to insure that the purchaser actually receives the benefits of the tax subsidy,
the provision requires that the seller certify that the purchase price is the lowest price
at which the residence was ever offered for sale. This provision does not, however, prevent
the seller from capturing benefits of the tax subsidy where, but for the tax subsidy, a
further price reduction would have been necessary in order to sell the property.
59 See, e.g., Panel Discussions, pt. 6, at 700 (statement of Paul R. McDaniel).
60 See, e.g., Pathways 134-38.
61 See Robert T. Masson & S. Wu, Price Discrimination for Physician's Services, 9 J.
Human Res. 63, 78 (1974); Roy J. Ruffin & Duane E. Leigh, Charity, Competition, and
the Pricing of Doctors' Services, 8 J. Human Res. 212 (1973).
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with regard to their high-income patients, as some of the literature suggests, 62
then any price increase will necessarily fall on lower-income patients. If this
description approximates reality, tax increases on doctors resulting from the
elimination of tax shelters might be passed on, at least in part, to low-income
63
consumers of medical services in the form of higher prices.
Doctors have been chosen as the subject of this discussion because their
monopolistic position is rather clear and because there is some evidence of
their nonprofit-maximizing pricing policies. Similar compensation patterns
may exist for lawyers, other professionals, and business executives operating in
oligopolistic markets. 64 A similar analysis may apply to certain labor unions;
where unions have oligopolistic power, the possibility of some income tax
shifting should not be ignored. If unions bargain with their employers in
terms of after-tax wages, tax increases may stimulate wage increases which in
turn might be passed on to consumers. 65 There is some evidence that this has
occurred in other countries.0 6
If the profit-maximization assumption is of only limited validity, the
nonshifting assumption should be similarly limited. As Professor Musgrave has
stated in a different context:
[The decisive difference in shifting condusions is] between models that do and
others that do not require profit-maximizing behavior and perfect capital mobility.
A theory which allows for imperfections and unconventional firm behavior, I
insist, can be the first move in a general equilibrium analysis no less than one which
rules them out. The outcome of the model depends on its behavioral assumptions,
e2 Ibid.
63

Because of other government policies, however, the lower-income patient might
not bear the total burden of any incrcased price of medical services. le
existence of
Medicare and Medicaid programs and widely used health insurance further complicates
the incidence question.
64 See Musgrave & Musgrave 387-88; Break 179. Principally as a result of availability
of more advantageous pension benefits for corporate employees, many doctors and
lawyers have incorporated their medical and legal practices, which had previously been
operated as proprietorships and partnerships. By setting appropriate salary levels for
employees these professional corporations are typically able to reduce their corporate
income tax liability to zero. If a corporate income tax were paid, the question whether
the tax would be borne by the doctors or lawyers as owners of the corporation or by
their patients as consumers of the corporation's services or by owners of capital would
be vigorously debated as part of the general issue of the incidence of the corporate income tax. But if the possibility of shifting is so widely recognized when the income
tax is imposed at the corporate level, why is it so universally ignored when the income
tax is imposed directly on the individual? The difference in legal organizations alone
cannot explain this divergent treatment. If a corporate income tax can be shifted to
consumers, surely it would be possible for similar shifting to take place when an
income tax is imposed on unincorporated enterprises.
65 See Break 178. The impact of such a possibility on absolute prices would also upset
many commonly held notions about the effect of tax changes on rates of inflation.
66 See Break 178, n. 127.
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including those which determine the initial response to the tax. It is, after all,
but a dispensing machine, where the juice you draw depends on which button you
push. While model builders like to assume away imperfections and market behavior
not aimed at profit maximization, it does not follow that no such things exist. It
just means that the economist's job is more difficult and that an understanding
67
of institutions becomes more important.
Again, the possibility of shifting suggests distributional consequences of tax
changes quite different from those commonly assumed by decision-makers.
CONCLUSION

A consensus exists in the economic literature that the individual income tax
is not shifted but is borne at the point of legal impact. The purpose of this
article has been to raise questions about the validity and universality of this
assumption. The nonshifting assumption is typically formulated in the context
of a general tax on income applied uniformly to all forms of economic income.
The income tax in the United States is very different from this economic model.
Given the numerous discriminations in tax, changes in relative prices and
factor incomes seem likely. In addition, the nonshifting hypothesis is firmly
predicated on the profit-maximization assumption-the assumption that individuals have maximized their monetary income prior to imposition of any
income tax. It may be that individuals, particularly professionals, other highincome individuals in oligopolistic markets, and certain labor unions do not
set prices to maximize before-tax profits.
The nonshifting assumption has not only been utilized in estimating the
general distribution of the income tax but also in estimating the distribution
of benefits of "tax subsidies" among various income classes. But there is a
need to apply incidence analysis to determine the effects of particular tax
subsidies on the relative distribution of income. Allocation of all of the benefits
of tax subsidies to the statutory beneficiaries will distort the real impact of
the tax change under consideration. I have demonstrated that changes in
particular provisions of the individual income tax seem likely to have significant price effects and that the possibility of substantial selective shifting
exists. An awareness of the potential significance of this phenomenon should
move the investigation of individual income tax incidence and the incidence
of income tax subsidies to a higher priority in the agenda of scholars and
policymakers.
67 Richard Musgrave, supra note 16, at 244-45.

